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Abstract
In this paper, we specify a class of mathematical problems, which we refer to as “Function Density
Problems” (FDPs, in short), and point out novel connections of FDPs to the following two cryptographic
topics; theoretical security evaluations of keyless hash functions (such as SHA-1), and constructions of
provably secure pseudorandom generators (PRGs) with some enhanced security property introduced by
Dubrov and Ishai (STOC 2006). Our argument aims at proposing new theoretical frameworks for these
topics (especially for the former) based on FDPs, rather than providing some concrete and practical
results on the topics. We also give some examples of mathematical discussions on FDPs, which would be
of independent interest from mathematical viewpoints. Finally, we discuss possible directions of future
research on other cryptographic applications of FDPs and on mathematical studies on FDPs themselves.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and related works
It is widely understood that some mathematical problems have been playing indispensable roles in research
on cryptography and information security. For instance, the (expected) computational difficulty of integer
factorization is the source of security of RSA cryptosystem [10], while the problem of solving multivariate
quadratic (MQ) equations has attracted several studies after the development of Matsumoto-Imai cryp-
tosystem [7] and its variants, whose constructions are closely related to MQ equations. Hence, posing and
studying an interesting mathematical problem which arises in certain cryptographic settings can contribute
to the progress of cryptography and information security.
The aim of this paper is to emphasize the significance of a certain mathematical problem, which has
connections to the following two major topics in information security; security analysis of keyless hash
functions in the real world (such as MD5 and SHA-1), and construction of pseudorandom generators (PRGs)
with some enhanced security property. First, we give some descriptions of these two topics.
Security analysis of keyless hash functions. Intuitively, a hash function is a function H : X → Y
from some (finite) set X to another (finite) set Y that possesses a certain desirable security property. When
we concern efficiency or computability of H , we consider an algorithm that computes H (also denoted by
H) and call it a hash algorithm. One of the standard security requirements for hash functions is collision
resistance, which informally means that it is difficult to find a collision pair (x1, x2) for H , i.e., x1 6= x2 ∈ X
satisfying H(x1) = H(x2). Hash functions have been playing central roles in various information security
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applications, and secure hash functions for real-life applications are usually expected to possess the collision
resistance property.
However, most of the preceding successful studies that show security of hash functions actually dealt
with keyed hash functions (or hash families); intuitively, a family of hash functions Hk parameterized by
a key k is called collision resistant if, for any (efficient) adversary, the attack to find a collision pair of Hk
fails with high probability for a randomly chosen key k. Several constructions of keyed hash functions have
been proposed so far (e.g., [3]). The above security notion of keyed hash functions can be interpreted as
allowing one to (randomly) choose a concrete instance Hk of the hash family after an adversary is given.
In contrast, in most of real-life applications, the concrete instance of hash algorithms is specified first (for
example, by a standardization), and then an adversary can try to attack the fixed hash algorithm. This
reversal of order causes a crucial difficulty in guaranteeing (or even formalizing in a reasonable manner)
security of a keyless hash algorithm H , as (unless the trivial situation where the domain of H is not larger
than the image of H) there does always exist a collision pair (x1, x2) for H and any adversary (existing in
theory) who innately knows the pair (x1, x2) is obviously able to efficiently attack the fixed hash algorithm
H . In fact, even an instance of standardized (or de facto standard) hash algorithms, whose security must be
evaluated well before the standardization, has been suffered from feasible attacks (e.g., [12]). In this paper,
we try to propose a theoretical and unified way to say something, preferably affirmative, about security of a
concrete (keyless) instance of hash algorithms.
For related works, Rogaway [11] gave a detailed observation about the difference between “inexistence of
effective attack algorithms” and “lack of knowledge on construction of effective attack algorithms” for keyless
hash algorithms. He emphasized the difference of the two situations (by the term “human ignorance”), and
discussed how to prove security of a cryptographic protocol by reducing the security into “lack of knowledge
on concrete attacks” on the hash algorithm internally used by the protocol. However, he did not discuss
how to theoretically evaluate security of keyless hash algorithms themselves, which we study in this paper.
On the other hand, in this paper we adopt concrete security formulation rather than asymptotic one; while
some observation for security of keyless hash algorithms in asymptotic security formulation is also given in
Rogaway’s paper.
Construction of enhanced PRGs. A PRG is an algorithm G : S → X with (finite) set S of inputs
(seeds) and (finite) output set X with the property that, when a seed s ∈ S is chosen uniformly at random,
the output G(s) ∈ X of G is also “random” in some sense. Conventionally, the meaning of “randomness”
here is formulated by using the notion of distinguisher, which is an algorithm D : X → {0, 1} with 1-bit
output and the input set being the output set X of G. In this paper we adopt concrete security formulation
rather than asymptotic one, in which case the security requirement for PRGs can be formulated as (T, ε)-
security; namely, G is called (T, ε)-secure [5] if, for any distinguisherD for G with (time) complexity bounded
by T , the statistical distance between the output distribution D(G(US)) of D with input given by G with
uniformly random seed s ∈ S (referred to as “pseudorandom input”) and the output distribution D(UX) of
D with uniformly random input x ∈ X (referred to as “random input”) is bounded by ε. (Intuitively, any
such D cannot distinguish the random element x and the pseudorandom element G(s) in X with significant
advantage.) There are a large number of constructions of PRGs, most of which are provably secure (possibly
in asymptotic security formulation) under standard computational assumptions (e.g., [2, 5]).
On the other hand, in a preceding work of Dubrov and Ishai [4], an enhanced notion for PRGs, called
pseudorandom generators that fool non-boolean distinguishers (nb-PRGs, in short), was proposed. This
notion is obtained by allowing the distinguishers D in the above security notion to have larger output sets;
namely, G is called (T, n, ε)-secure if, for any “non-boolean” distinguisher D : X → Y for G with (time)
complexity bounded by T and output set Y of size at most n, the statistical distance between the output
distributions of D with random and pseudorandom inputs is bounded by ε. Dubrov and Ishai showed
interesting applications of nb-PRGs, e.g., secure pseudorandomization of a certain kind of information-
theoretically secure protocols without any restriction on computational complexity of the adversary’s attack
algorithm.
However, constructing secure nb-PRGs seems much more difficult than the case of the usual PRGs.
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Indeed, to the authors’ best knowledge, the only constructions of nb-PRGs proposed so far are ones in the
original paper [4], which are based on certain less standard computational assumptions. Hence it will be
fruitful if we can give some results implying that any usual PRG (with some parameter) is also an nb-PRG
(with a possibly different parameter). In fact, a straightforward implication has been mentioned in [4], but
this is far from being efficient (i.e., to obtain nb-PRGs with reasonable security parameters, the original
PRGs are required to have somewhat impractical security parameters). In this paper, we try to establish a
more efficient implication result.
1.2 Our contributions, and organization of this paper
In Section 2, we propose a class of mathematical problems, which we refer to as “Function Density Problems”.
Intuitively, this problem is to evaluate the possibility of close approximations of arbitrary functions by using
some “easily describable (or analyzable)” functions.
Then we introduce motivating applications of Function Density Problems to two topics in information
security. First, in Section 3, we discuss theoretical analysis of collision resistance of keyless hash algorithms.
We give an abstract framework for attacking a given hash algorithm by using known attacks on some other
“easily breakable” hash algorithms. In the framework, it is essential to evaluate how closely a target hash
algorithm can be approximated by “easily breakable” hash algorithms; thus Function Density Problems play
a significant role in the security evaluation of hash algorithms.
Secondly, in Section 4, we study an enhanced security notion for PRGs (called nb-PRG) introduced by
Dubrov and Ishai [4]. We give some implication results showing that any secure PRG with some parameter
is also a secure nb-PRG with somewhat modified security parameter. In the results, the overheads in the
bounds of (time) complexity and of advantages for the distinguishers are in trade-off relations, and Function
Density Problems can be applied to evaluate to what extent the trade-off will be improved by our proposed
result.
Then, in order to arise some image or intuition of how Function Density Problems can be mathematically
studied, in Section 5 we give some concrete examples of mathematical discussions on Function Density
Problems themselves, using combinatorial and geometric arguments and techniques in Gro¨bner bases. In
particular, we deal with special cases where the set of “easily describable (or analyzable)” functions forms
a linear subspace (related to low-degree boolean functions, perfect linear codes and Reed–Solomon codes),
which would be of independent interest from mathematical viewpoints.
Finally, in Section 6 we give a concluding remark, which includes discussions on further possible appli-
cations of Function Density Problems in information security, and on possible directions of future research
on Function Density Problems themselves.
2 Function Density Problems
In this section, we specify a class of mathematical problems, which we call Function Density Problems
(FDPs) in this paper. As the class of FDPs in a most general form will include too various problems to
obtain meaningful insights for their properties, it is significant to restrict the class suitably according to each
situation under consideration. Relations of FDPs to some concrete topics in cryptography will be shown in
the following sections.
We give a general description of our problem:
Definition 1 (Function Density Problems). Let C be a set of some functions, and let C′ be a subset of C.
Let d(·, ·) be a distance function for the pairs of functions in C. In this setting, we define a Function Density
Problem to be a problem of estimating the following quantity:
r(C, C′) := sup{d(f, C′) | f ∈ C} , (1)
where, for each f ∈ C, d(f, C′) := inf{d(f, g) | g ∈ C′} is the distance from f to C′. (The symbol ‘r’ stands
for “radius”, by an analogy as if C′ is a single central point in the figure C, in which case the r is the radius
of C in usual sense.)
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Among very various situations covered by Definition 1 (where C in fact need not even to be a set of
functions), in the applications of FDPs discussed in this paper we will focus on the following typical cases:
Definition 2 (Function Density Problems – typical cases). Let C be the set of all functions f : X → Y from
a given finite set X to a given finite set Y . Let C′ ⊂ C. For any f, g ∈ C, we define the distance between f
and g by
dH(f, g) := |{x ∈ X | f(x) 6= g(x)}| . (2)
In this setting, a Function Density Problem is a problem of estimating the quantity r(C, C′) defined by (1)
with d(·, ·) = dH(·, ·).
In the case of Definition 2, the “sup” and “inf” in Definition 1 can be simply replaced with “max”
and “min”, respectively. Moreover, the distance defined by (2) coincides with the (generalized) Hamming
distance when members of C are identified with sequences of length |X | over the alphabet Y in a natural
manner. Note that the quantity r(C, C′) can be regarded as a special case of so-called Hausdorff distance for
two subsets of a metric space, which would support that it is reasonable to consider r(C, C′).
An intuitive explanation of a motivation for the above definition is as follows. Given a set C of functions, a
subset C′ consists of members of C which are in some sense “easily analyzable” or “with simple descriptions”.
The distance d(f, g) measures how two functions f and g are similar. Then the quantity d(f, C′) evaluates
how accurately a function f ∈ C can be approximated by an “easy” function in C′, and the quantity r(C, C′)
evaluates how densely the “easy” functions distribute among the entire set C. In other words, when r(C, C′) is
revealed to be small, it shows potential availability of a close approximation of any member of C by an “easy”
function in C′. For example, in the case of Definition 2, any function f ∈ C can in principle be converted
into some function g ∈ C′ by changing the values f(x) for at most r(C, C′) points x ∈ X . (We emphasize
that it does not mean that a close approximation of f by a function in C′ can be efficiently computable.
Such a difference between existence and efficient computability is also relevant to a preceding observation
for “human ignorance” by Rogaway [11].)
3 Hash Functions and FDPs
In this section, we point out a relation of FDPs introduced in Section 2 to security analysis of keyless hash
functions. Here we propose a new framework for theoretical security evaluation of keyless hash functions
based on FDPs. Although theoretical security evaluation of keyless hash functions is evidently an extremely
difficult problem and our proposed framework is unfortunately not yet practical, we hope that our framework
can be a clue to this problem.
We consider a keyless hash function H : X → Y with possibly large but finite domain X and relatively
small (finite) range Y . Among the major security requirements for hash functions, we focus on the collision
resistance of H ; we discuss how it is difficult to find a collision pair (x1, x2) for H (recall that (x1, x2) is
called a collision pair for H if we have x1, x2 ∈ X , x1 6= x2 and H(x1) = H(x2)). To show the relevance of
FDPs to this problem, first we give a somewhat informal description of an abstract “typical” strategy for
finding a collision pair:
1. Construct a close approximation H ′ : X → Y of H in such a way that collision pairs for H ′ can be
found with reasonable computational time.
2. Find randomly a collision pair (x′1, x
′
2) for H
′.
3. Construct from (x′1, x
′
2) a candidate (x1, x2) of a collision pair for H (in the simplest case, we just set
(x1, x2) = (x
′
1, x
′
2)).
4. Check if (x1, x2) is a collision pair of H ; if it is indeed a collision pair of H , then output (x1, x2) and
stop the process.
5. If (x1, x2) is not a collision pair of H , go back to Step (2) and repeat the process.
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Intuitively, the number of iterations in the above strategy before finding a collision pair for H would be
expected to be small if the approximation H ′ is sufficiently close to H (see Lemma 1 below for a quantitative
expression of this expected tendency). Hence security of a hash algorithm H against such an attack strategy
is related to the possibility of finding its close approximation.
More precisely, we set (x1, x2) = (x
′
1, x
′
2) in the above strategy for simplicity. We consider the case
of Definition 2, and let C′ be a subset of C with the property that any hash function H ′ in C′ admits an
efficient attack (finding a collision pair) by a certain known attack strategy. In the above attack strategy, the
approximation H ′ for H specified in Step (1) is supposed to be chosen from C′. Now we have the following
lemma:
Lemma 1. Suppose that H and H ′ are functions X → Y with |Y | = n ≥ 2, and dH(H,H ′) = d, 0 < d < |X |.
Then the probability that a collision pair for H ′, which is chosen uniformly at random from the set of all
collision pairs for H ′, is also a collision pair for H is not lower than
2α0|X | − n(α0 + 1)α0 − 2dα0
2α0|X |+ 2d|X | − n(α0 + 1)α0 − 2dα0 − d2 − d
, (3)
where α0 = ⌊(|X | − d − 1)/n⌋. Moreover, when |X | ≥ d + (n − 1)2, the value in (3) is getting larger as d
becomes smaller.
A proof of Lemma 1 will be provided in the last of this section. Now let us imagine the following situation.
Two candidate sets C1, C2 for a new standard hash function are given, and we can specify subsets C′1 ⊂ C1
and C′2 ⊂ C2 in such a way that each C
′
i (i = 1, 2) consists of some hash functions for which collision pairs
can be found in reasonable computational time by using some known techniques. We suppose that r(C1, C′1)
is significantly small and r(C2, C′2) is significantly large. Then any hash function H chosen from C1 can be
potentially attacked by just finding a close approximation H ′ ∈ C′1 of H (using some expert’s sixth sense,
for example) and applying the above attack strategy combined with known collision finding techniques. On
the other hand, C2 contains at least one hash function H for which the above attack strategy combined with
any known collision finding technique will not succeed. This would suggest that it can be potentially safer
to choose a new hash function from C2 rather than C1, as we already know the potential attack on any hash
function in C1 but not the same for C2.
The authors hope that studies of FDPs can contribute to security analysis of keyless hash functions in
the above manner, though how to specify the subset C′ in practical cases is of course a big problem to be
concerned. One may also feel that it seems infeasible to compute the quantity r(C, C′) for practical classes
of hash functions; even if so, some estimate of a bound or tendency of r(C, C′) would still give us an insight
into the security level of those hash functions.
Remark 1. Here we notice that, although we have focused on the collision resistance in the above argument,
a similar idea would also be applicable to other security notions for keyless hash functions, such as the
(second) preimage resistance.
To conclude this section, we give a proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. We write (m)2 := m(m − 1) for any integer m. Put Y := {y1, . . . , yn}, and for each
1 ≤ i ≤ n, put
ai := |{x ∈ X | H
′(x) = yi}| , bi := |{x ∈ X | H(x) 6= H ′(x) = yi}| . (4)
Moreover, put
ϕ1(~a;~b) :=
n∑
i=1
(ai)2 , ϕ2(~a;~b) :=
n∑
i=1
(ai − bi)2 , (5)
where ~a := (a1, . . . , an) and ~b := (b1, . . . , bn). Then the number of collision pairs for H
′ is ϕ1(~a;~b), while the
number of collision pairs for H is at least ϕ2(~a;~b). Therefore the probability specified in the statement of
Lemma 1 is at least
ϕ(~a;~b) :=
ϕ2(~a;~b)
ϕ1(~a;~b)
. (6)
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From now, we give a lower bound for the values of ϕ under the following conditions implied by the definitions:
0 ≤ bi ≤ ai for each i,
∑n
i=1 ai = |X |, and
∑n
i=1 bi = d. For the purpose, we show the following two lemmas:
Lemma 2. In the above setting, if the minimum value of the function ϕ is attained by ~a and ~b, then we
have bi > 0 for a unique index i, and ai − bi ≥ aj for every index j 6= i.
Proof. If we have i 6= j and bi, bj > 0, and we suppose ai ≤ aj by symmetry, then we have
(
(ai − 1)2 + (aj + 1)2
)
−
(
(ai)2 + (aj)2
)
= 2(aj − ai + 1) > 0 , (7)
therefore the value of ϕ1 increases when ai, aj , bi and bj are replaced with ai − 1, aj + 1, bi − 1 and bj + 1,
respectively. On the other hand, the value of ϕ2 is not changed by this replacement. Therefore the value of
ϕ is decreased by this replacement, contradicting the assumption on the choice of ~a and ~b. Hence an index
i with bi > 0 is unique, therefore bi = d. Similarly, if j 6= i and ai − bi < aj , then we have
(
(ai − bi + 1)2 + (aj − 1)2
)
−
(
(ai − bi)2 + (aj)2
)
= 2(ai − bi − aj + 1) ≤ 0 , (8)
with equality holding when and only when ai − bi = aj − 1. This implies that the value of ϕ at the ~a and ~b
is larger than or equal to the value of ϕ with bi and bj (= 0) being replaced with bi − 1 and 1, respectively,
where the equality holds if and only if ai − bi = aj − 1. As the former value is assumed to be the minimum,
the equality condition ai − bi = aj − 1 should hold. Moreover, if bi − 1 > 0, then the latter value of ϕ
(which is now equal to the former) cannot be the minimum by the above argument, which also leads to a
contradiction. Hence we have bi = 1 (therefore d = 1) and ai = aj . Now we have
(
(ai + 1)2 + (aj − 1)2
)
−
(
(ai)2 + (aj)2
)
= 2(ai − aj + 1) > 0 . (9)
This implies that the value of ϕ will decrease when ai and aj are replaced with ai+1 and aj−1, respectively,
contradicting the assumption that the former value is the minimum. Hence we have ai − bi ≥ aj for every
j 6= i, concluding the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. In the above setting, if the minimum of the function ϕ is attained by ~a and ~b, then we have
|ai − aj | ≤ 1 for any pair of indices i 6= j satisfying bi = bj = 0.
Proof. Assume contrary that ai − aj ≥ 2 for such a pair of indices i 6= j. For ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, let αℓ denote the
value of ϕℓ at the ~a and ~b, and let βℓ denote the value of ϕℓ with ai and aj being replaced with ai − 1 and
aj + 1, respectively. Then we have β1 − α1 = β2 − α2 = 2(aj − ai + 1) < 0. On the other hand, for the
unique index i′ with bi′ > 0 (see Lemma 2), we have ai′ ≥ bi′ + ai ≥ bi′ + aj + 2 ≥ 2 by the assumption and
Lemma 2, therefore α1 > α2. Now we present the following lemma, which is proven by an easy calculation:
Lemma 4. If p > q ≥ 0 and r > 0, then q/p < (q + r)/(p+ r).
By using this lemma, we have
α2
α1
=
β2 − 2(aj − ai + 1)
β1 − 2(aj − ai + 1)
>
β2
β1
, (10)
contradicting the assumption that α2/α1 is the minimum of the value of ϕ. Hence Lemma 3 holds.
By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, the points ~a and ~b that attain the minimum of ϕ satisfy the following
conditions: bi > 0 for a unique i, and there is an integer α satisfying that ai− bi ≥ α+1 and aj ∈ {α, α+1}
for every j 6= i. Note that this α can be taken as α ≥ 0; indeed, this is obvious if some aj with j 6= i is positive,
while the remaining possibility that aj = 0 for every j 6= i allows us to choose α = 0 as ai = |X | > d = bi
and ai− bi ≥ 1. Let k be the number of indices j 6= i with aj = α+1, therefore 0 ≤ k ≤ n−1. Then we have
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ai = |X |− (n−1)α−k, while bi = d, therefore the condition ai−bi ≥ α+1 implies that k ≤ |X |−nα−d−1.
Now we write the values of ϕ1 and ϕ2 in this case as ϕ1(α, k) and ϕ2(α, k), respectively. Then we have
ϕ1(α, k) = k(α+ 1)2 + (n− 1− k)(α)2 + (ai)2 ,
ϕ2(α, k) = k(α+ 1)2 + (n− 1− k)(α)2 + (ai − d)2 ,
(11)
therefore ϕ1(α, k)− ϕ2(α, k) = 2dai − d
2 − d. Now by Lemma 4, we have
1−
ϕ2(α, k)
ϕ1(α, k)
=
2dai − d
2 − d
ϕ1(α, k)
≤
2dai − d
2 − d+ 2d((n− 1)α+ k)
ϕ1(α, k) + 2d((n− 1)α+ k)
=
2d|X | − d2 − d
k(α+ 1)2 + (n− 1− k)(α)2 + (ai)2 + 2d(n− 1)α+ 2dk
(12)
(note that 2d((n− 1)α+k) ≥ 0 as α ≥ 0). Let ψ(α, k) denote the denominator of the right-hand side. Then,
by virtue of the property ∂∂kai = −1, we have
∂
∂k
ψ(α, k) = (α+ 1)2 − (α)2 − (2ai − 1) + 2d = 2α− 2ai + 1 + 2d < 0 (13)
(note that ai − d ≥ α + 1), therefore ψ(α, k) is decreasing as k is increasing. On the other hand, we have
ψ(α, n− 1) = ψ(α+1, 0). Now note that α ≤ (|X |− d− 1)/n as 0 ≤ k ≤ |X |−nα− d− 1. This implies that
ψ(α, k) takes the minimum value at α = ⌊(|X | − d− 1)/n⌋ = α0 and k = k0 := |X | − nα0 − d− 1 (note that
k0 ≤ n− 1). Moreover, we have ai = α0 + d + 1 if α = α0 and k = k0. Hence a straightforward calculation
shows that
1−
ϕ2(α, k)
ϕ1(α, k)
≤
2d|X | − d2 − d
ψ(α0, k0)
=
2d|X | − d2 − d
2α0|X |+ 2d|X | − n(α0 + 1)α0 − 2dα0 − d2 − d
,
(14)
therefore
ϕ2(α, k)
ϕ1(α, k)
≥ 1−
2d|X | − d2 − d
2α0|X |+ 2d|X | − n(α0 + 1)α0 − 2dα0 − d2 − d
=
2α0|X | − n(α0 + 1)α0 − 2dα0
2α0|X |+ 2d|X | − n(α0 + 1)α0 − 2dα0 − d2 − d
,
(15)
which proves the lower bound (3) in the statement of Lemma 1.
Finally, suppose that d ≥ 2, and let η1(d) and η2(d) denote the denominator and the numerator in (3),
respectively. For any value x depending on d, let ∆[x] temporarily denote the value of x at d− 1 minus the
value of x at d. Then we have ∆(−d2 − d) = 2d, therefore
∆[η2(d)] = ∆[2α0|X | − n(α0 + 1)α0 − 2dα0] ,
∆[η1(d)] = ∆[2α0|X | − n(α0 + 1)α0 − 2dα0]− 2|X |+ 2d < ∆[η2(d)] .
(16)
Moreover, we have ∆[α0] ∈ {0, 1}, and if ∆[α0] = 0, then ∆[η2(d)] = 2dα0 > 0. On the other hand, if
∆[α0] = 1, then we have
∆[(α0 + 1)α0] = (α0 + 2)(α0 + 1)− (α0 + 1)α0 = 2(α0 + 1) ,
∆[2dα0] = 2(d− 1)(α0 + 1)− 2dα0 = 2d− 2α0 − 2 ,
(17)
therefore
∆[η2(d)] = 2|X | − 2n(α0 + 1)− 2d+ 2α0 + 2
= 2|X | − 2(n− 1)α0 − 2n− 2d+ 2
≥ 2|X | − 2(n− 1)
|X | − d− 1
n
− 2n− 2d+ 2
=
2
n
(
|X | − d+ 2n− 1− n2
)
≥ 0
(18)
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(where we used the assumption |X | ≥ d+ (n− 1)2). Now by Lemma 4, we have
η2(d− 1)
η1(d− 1)
=
η2(d) + ∆[η2(d)]
η1(d) + ∆[η1(d)]
≥
η2(d)
η1(d) + ∆[η1(d)] −∆[η2(d)]
>
η2(d)
η1(d)
. (19)
Hence the proof of Lemma 1 is concluded.
4 PRGs and FDPs
As our second application of FDPs, in this section we present some results which prove that any (computa-
tionally indistinguishable) PRG with some parameter is also an nb-PRG with a (possibly different) specified
parameter. The concrete relations between parameters for an algorithm as a PRG and as an nb-PRG,
respectively, will be determined by applying FDPs.
First we recall the security notion for PRGs. We emphasize that, for the sake of simplicity, here we
adopt definitions in forms of concrete security rather than asymptotic security. Let UX denote the uniform
probability distribution over a finite set X .
Definition 3 (see e.g., [5]). Let G : S → X be an algorithm with finite input set S and finite output set X .
Given parameters T ≥ 0 and ε ≥ 0, G is called a (T, ε)-secure pseudorandom generator (PRG) if, for any
algorithm (called a distinguisher) D : X → {0, 1} with time complexity bounded by T , we have AdvD(G) ≤ ε
where AdvD(G) denotes the advantage of D defined by
AdvD(G) := |Pr[D(UX) = 1]− Pr[D(G(US)) = 1]| . (20)
Let ∆(P1, P2) denote the statistical distance of two probability distributions P1, P2 over the same finite
set Z defined by
∆(P1, P2) :=
1
2
∑
z∈Z
|Pr[P1 = z]− Pr[P2 = z]| (21)
= max
E⊂Z
|Pr[P1 ∈ E]− Pr[P2 ∈ E]| . (22)
Then the advantage AdvD(G) of a distinguisher D defined above is equal to ∆(D(UX), D(G(US))), as both
D(UX) and D(G(US)) are probability distributions over {0, 1}. This interpretation of the advantage gives
us a motivation to enhance the above security notion of PRGs, as in the following definition introduced by
Dubrov and Ishai [4] (with slightly different formulation):
Definition 4 ([4]). Let G : S → X be an algorithm with finite input set S and finite output set X .
Given parameters T ≥ 0, ε ≥ 0 and an integer n ≥ 2, G is called (T, n, ε)-secure if, for any algorithm
(distinguisher) D : X → {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} with time complexity bounded by T , we have AdvD(G) ≤ ε where
we put AdvD(G) := ∆(D(UX), D(G(US))). Such an algorithm G is called a PRG that fools non-boolean
distinguishers (nb-PRG, in short).
Note that (T, 2, ε)-security is equivalent to (T, ε)-security in Definition 3. Several applications of nb-
PRGs are discussed in [4]. For example, it was shown that randomness used in some kinds of information-
theoretically secure protocols (such as multi-party computation of certain types) can be replaced with outputs
of nb-PRGs, without any restriction on computational complexity of the adversary against the protocol.
However, despite the significance of nb-PRGs mentioned above, it seems much more difficult to construct
secure nb-PRGs than the case of usual PRGs against 1-bit output distinguishers. Indeed, to the authors’
best knowledge, the only constructions of nb-PRGs in the literature so far are the ones by Dubrov and Ishai
themselves in the original paper [4], and their construction is based on certain computational assumption
which is less standard than those used in constructions of usual PRGs. Hence, it is worthy to investigate a
method to construct nb-PRGs (under standard computational assumptions).
8
Our proposal here is to establish a general theorem of the following form: Any (T ′, ε′)-secure PRG is
also a (T, n, ε)-secure nb-PRG, where the parameters T ′ and ε′ as a usual PRG are determined by T , n
and ε in a certain manner. Such an implication result is evidently meaningful, as it enables us to convert a
large number of existing PRGs under standard assumptions into nb-PRGs. In fact, an implication relation
as above has been mentioned (without proof) in [4]. Our aim here is to improve the preceding relation by
introducing the idea of FDPs.
The above-mentioned relation is derived from the first expression (21) of statistical distance, in the
following manner (which refers to a description in [9]). We introduce some notations. Put Y := {0, 1, . . . , n−
1} for simplicity. For any subset Z ⊂ Y , let χZ : Y → {0, 1} denote the characteristic function of Z defined
by χZ(x) = 1 if x ∈ Z and χZ(x) = 0 if x ∈ Y \ Z. We write χz = χ{z} for simplicity when Z = {z}. In
this setting, for any PRG G : S → X and any non-boolean distinguisher D : X → Y , the statistical distance
∆(D(UX), D(G(US))) is equal to
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|Pr[D(UX) = y]− Pr[D(G(US)) = y]|
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
|Pr[χy ◦D(UX) = 1]− Pr[χy ◦D(G(US)) = 1]|
=
1
2
∑
y∈Y
Advχy◦D(G) ,
(23)
where χy ◦D denotes an algorithm performed by first executing the distinguisher D and then evaluating the
output of D by the function χy. An important property is that χy ◦D is a 1-bit output algorithm, therefore
it can be regarded as a distinguisher for the PRG G. This implies that, to show that a (T ′, ε′)-secure PRG G
is also a (T, n, ε)-secure nb-PRG, it suffices to choose the parameters as T ′ = T + δ1 and ε′ = 2ε/n, where δ1
is the maximum of the overhead in computational complexity of composing some χy (y ∈ Y ) to D (usually,
δ1 can be set to be almost zero in practical situations). In other words, we have the following proposition
(which has been mentioned in [4]):
Proposition 1. In this setting, any (T + δ1, 2ε/n)-secure PRG is also (T, n, ε)-secure, where the quantity
δ1 is defined in the above manner.
A drawback of this result is that, in practical applications the parameter n (which is relevant to the
allowable input size for an adversary against a protocol under consideration) should frequently be large,
which makes the overhead in a bound of advantage in Proposition 1 too heavy. We try to resolve the
drawback by improving or modifying the above result.
Our first idea is to use the second expression (22) of statistical distance instead of the first one (21) used in
the preceding argument. Namely, in the same setting as above, the statistical distance ∆(D(UX), D(G(US)))
is equal to
max
Z⊂Y
|Pr[D(UX) ∈ Z]− Pr[D(G(US)) ∈ Z]|
= max
Z⊂Y
|Pr[χZ ◦D(UX) = 1]− Pr[χZ ◦D(G(US)) = 1]|
= max
Z⊂Y
AdvχZ◦D(G) .
(24)
In the same way as Proposition 1, the above argument implies the following result:
Proposition 2. In this setting, any (T +δ2, ε)-secure PRG is also (T, n, ε)-secure, where δ2 is the maximum
of the overhead in computational complexity of composing some χZ with Z ⊂ Y := {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} to D.
In contrast to Proposition 1, there exists no overhead for a bound of advantage ε in Proposition 2.
However, instead, the overhead δ2 for a bound of time complexity of distinguishers is expected to be too
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heavy, as the set Y (of somewhat large size) may contain an extremely complicated subset Z, for which the
computation of χZ would be inefficient.
From now, we try to improve the above-mentioned trade-off between overheads for bounds of advantage
and of computational complexity, by applying the idea of FDPs. Put Y := {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} as above, and let
C be the set of characteristic functions χZ : Y → {0, 1} for subsets Z ⊂ Y , and let d = dH (see (2)). Then for
χY1 , χY2 ∈ C, dH(χY1 , χY2) is equal to the size of the symmetric difference Y1 ⊖ Y2 := (Y1 \ Y2) ∪ (Y2 \ Y1) of
two subsets Y1 and Y2. Now we fix a subset C′ of C. Let δ3 be the maximum of the overhead in computational
complexity of composing some χZ ∈ C′ to D. Moreover, we put r := r(C, C′) for simplicity. Then we have the
following result (we notice that, when C′ = {χ∅}, the theorem gives almost the same result as Proposition
1):
Theorem 1. In the above situation, let δ1 be as specified in Proposition 1. If G : S → X is (T+δ1, ε1)-secure
and (T + δ3, ε3)-secure, then G is also (T, n, rε1 + ε3)-secure.
Proof. For each distinguisher D : X → Y := {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}, we write µ(Z) := Pr[D(UX) ∈ Z] and
µ′(Z) := Pr[D(G(US)) ∈ Z] for a subset Z ⊂ Y . Let Y0 be a subset of Y that attains the maximum of the
second expression (22) of the statistical distance;
∆(D(UX), D(G(US))) = |µ(Y0)− µ
′(Y0)| . (25)
Note that Y0 can be chosen in such a way that µ(Y0)− µ′(Y0) ≥ 0 (if this inequality fails, use Y \ Y0 instead
of Y0), therefore
∆(D(UX), D(G(US))) = µ(Y0)− µ
′(Y0) . (26)
Moreover, by the definition of r, there is a subset Y1 ⊂ Y satisfying that χY1 ∈ C
′ and dH(χY0 , χY1) =
|Y0 ⊖ Y1| ≤ r. Now we have
ν(Y0)− ν(Y1) = ν(Y0 \ Y1)− ν(Y1 \ Y0) for each ν ∈ {µ, µ
′} , (27)
therefore we have
(µ(Y0)− µ
′(Y0))− (µ(Y1)− µ′(Y1))
= (µ(Y0)− µ(Y1))− (µ
′(Y0)− µ′(Y1))
= (µ(Y0 \ Y1)− µ
′(Y0 \ Y1))− (µ(Y1 \ Y0)− µ′(Y1 \ Y0)) .
(28)
Moreover, the right-hand side is equal to
∑
y∈Y0\Y1
(µ({y})− µ′({y}))−
∑
y∈Y1\Y0
(µ({y})− µ′({y}))
≤
∑
y∈Y0⊖Y1
|µ({y})− µ′({y})|
=
∑
y∈Y0⊖Y1
|Pr[χy ◦D(UX) = 1]− Pr[χy ◦D(G(US)) = 1]|
=
∑
y∈Y0⊖Y1
Advχy◦D(G) .
(29)
Now if D has computational complexity bounded by T , then the assumption on G and the definition of δ1
imply that ∑
y∈Y0⊖Y1
Advχy◦D(G) ≤
∑
y∈Y0⊖Y1
ε1 = |Y0 ⊖ Y1| · ε1 ≤ rε1 . (30)
Summarizing, we have
(µ(Y0)− µ
′(Y0))− (µ(Y1)− µ′(Y1)) ≤ rε1 . (31)
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This and (26) implies that
∆(D(UX), D(G(US)))
= (µ(Y0)− µ
′(Y0))− (µ(Y1)− µ′(Y1)) + (µ(Y1)− µ′(Y1))
≤ rε1 + (Pr[D(UX ) ∈ Y1]− Pr[D(G(US)) ∈ Y1])
≤ rε1 + |Pr[χY1 ◦D(UX) = 1]− Pr[χY1 ◦D(G(US)) = 1]|
= rε1 + AdvχY1◦D(G) ≤ rε1 + ε3 ,
(32)
concluding the proof of Theorem 1.
Regarding the relation between parameters in Theorem 1, first note that it is natural by the definitions
to expect that δ1 ≤ δ3, which allows us to suppose that ε1 ≤ ε3. Now let us imagine the following situation:
We can find an appropriate subset C′ ⊂ C in such a way that every characteristic function χZ ∈ C′ has low
computational complexity and the quantity r := r(C, C′) is small. In this case, δ3 can be small as well as r,
and it would make the implication relation given by Theorem 1 more efficient than those in Propositions 1
and 2, therefore the above-mentioned trade-off is improved. Hence a study of FDPs (in particular, those for
functions with 1-bit output sets) will contribute to establish a better relation between PRGs and nb-PRGs.
Remark 2. We mention that, for the two applications of FDPs discussed in the last two sections, a kind
of “risk-hedging” relation exists as follows. Namely, if we find that the quantity r(C, C′) tends to be large
in general, then it would support the argument in Section 3 to show that keyless hash functions under
consideration would have better security. On the other hand, if we find that the quantity r(C, C′) tends to
be small in general, then it would support the argument in Section 4 to show that overheads in parameters
for nb-PRGs compared to PRGs would be practically small.
At the last of this section, we give an example of the possible choices of the distinguished subset C′ of
C. We consider the case that n = 2ℓ for an integer ℓ; now the set Y is identified with {0, 1}ℓ via the binary
expression of integers, and each element χZ of C is regarded as a boolean function {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} with ℓ-bit
input. In this setting, our task is to find a set C′ of “easy” boolean functions with ℓ-bit inputs, for which each
function in C can be closely approximated by some function in C′. Here we consider ℓ-variable disjunctive
normal form (DNF ) formulae; recall that a literal is yi or yi (logical NOT of yi) where y1, . . . , yℓ ∈ {0, 1}
are input bits for a boolean function, a term is a logical AND of literals, and a DNF formula is a logical
OR of terms. The number of terms in a DNF formula is called the size of the formula. It is straightforward
to show that any ℓ-bit input boolean function is equivalent to some DNF formula of size 2ℓ. Below we will
define C′ to be the set of (ℓ-bit input) boolean functions which are either a logical XOR of at most ℓ DNF
formulae of size significantly smaller than 2ℓ, or the logical NOT of such a function. Now the functions in C′
is expected to be easier to compute than general boolean functions, hence the overhead δ3 in the bound for
the distinguisher’s computational complexity in Theorem 1 would be significantly better (i.e., smaller) than
its counterpart δ2 in Proposition 2, as desired.
Before specifying the sizes of the DNF formulae in the choice of C′, first we give the following argument.
A boolean function f : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} is called monotone, if yi ≤ y′i for every i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} implies
f(y1, . . . , yℓ) ≤ f(y
′
1, . . . , y
′
ℓ). We note that χZ ∈ C is monotone if and only if Z ⊂ {0, 1}
ℓ is a filter (i.e.,
upper-closed set) of the ℓ-dimensional lattice {0, 1}ℓ. Then we have the following result:
Lemma 5. Any χZ ∈ C with ~0 := (0, 0, . . . , 0) 6∈ Z can be expressed as the logical XOR of at most ℓ
monotone boolean functions.
Proof. Let Z1 denote the filter of {0, 1}ℓ generated by the minimal (with respect to the order of {0, 1}ℓ)
elements of Z. Then we have Z ⊂ Z1 and χZ = χZ1 ⊕ χZ1\Z where ⊕ denotes the logical XOR. The
claim holds if Z1 \ Z = ∅. On the other hand, if Z1 \ Z 6= ∅, then we iterate the process to decompose
χZ1\Z . As the minimum weight of minimal elements of Z1 \Z is strictly larger than the minimum weight of
minimal elements of Z, and ~0 6∈ Z by the assumption, the process terminates with at most ℓ steps, giving
the decomposition χZ = χZ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ χZℓ′ with Zi being filters of {0, 1}
ℓ, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ′ ≤ ℓ. Hence the claim
holds.
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By the lemma, for any χZ ∈ C, either χZ or χZ = χ{0,1}ℓ\Z can be expressed as the logical XOR of
at most ℓ monotone boolean functions. On the other hand, for each of these monotone functions, recently
Blais, H˚astad, Servedio and Tan [1] showed the following result:
Proposition 3 (See [1]). For any 0 < η < 1, every ℓ-bit input monotone boolean function f can be approx-
imated by a DNF formula g of size 2ℓ−Ω(
√
ℓ) satisfying that d(f, g) ≤ η · 2ℓ (where the dependence on η is
omitted in the Ω notation for simplicity).
Owing to the result, we define the subset C′ of C as above, with the sizes of the DNF formulae satisfying
the bound in Proposition 3. Then by Lemma 5 and Proposition 3, we have r = r(C, C′) ≤ ℓη · 2ℓ, which is
o(2ℓ) if η = o(1/ℓ). This makes the trade-off in Theorem 1 better than Proposition 1 as desired, if ε3 is not
too larger than r · ε1.
We note that there are several results in the literature on approximations of boolean functions by not
only DNF formulae but also those in other special classes. For example, upper approximations of boolean
functions (i.e., approximations of f by g satisfying that f(y) ≤ g(y) for every y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ) by affine boolean
functions were studied in e.g., [6]. The authors hope that the present work provides another motivation for
the well-studied area of good approximations of boolean functions.
5 Mathematical Examples of FDPs
This section is devoted to describe some examples for mathematical studies of FDPs themselves, rather than
their cryptographic applications such as ones discussed in Sections 3 and 4. The authors hope that one
would feel that FDPs themselves are of independent interest as mathematical problems and mathematical
studies of FDPs will be promoted.
5.1 Vector spaces and their subspaces: A general bound
The examples of FDPs discussed below can be interpreted in the following manner. The set C forms a
finite-dimensional vector space over a finite field F, with a distinguished basis v1, . . . , vd where d := dim(C),
hence each element of C admits a vector expression. A subset C′ is a linear subspace of C, and the distance
d(f, g) is defined to be the (generalized) Hamming distance with respect to the vector expressions of f, g ∈ C.
In this subsection, we show a general upper and lower bounds of the quantity r(C, C′) in this case. Namely,
we have the following:
Proposition 4. In the above setting, let ℓ denote the minimal integer ℓ′ satisfying that
∑ℓ′
i=0
(
d
i
)
(|F|− 1)i ≥
|F|codimC(C
′), where codimC(C′) denotes the codimension d−dim(C′) of C′ in C. Then we have ℓ ≤ r(C, C′) ≤
codimC(C′).
Proof. Put d′ := dim(C′), therefore codimC(C′) = d − d′. First we prove the lower bound. For each w ∈ C
and k ≥ 0, put B(w, k) := {w′ ∈ C | d(w,w′) ≤ k}. Then we have |B(w, k)| =
∑k
i=0
(
d
i
)
(|F| − 1)i. On the
other hand, by the definition of r(C, C′), we have C ⊂
⋃
w∈C′ B(w, r(C, C
′)). This implies that
|C| ≤ |C′| ·
r(C,C′)∑
i=0
(
d
i
)
(|F| − 1)i , (33)
or equivalently |F|d−d
′
= |C|/|C′| ≤
∑r(C,C′)
i=0
(
d
i
)
(|F| − 1)i. Hence we have ℓ ≤ r(C, C′) by the choice of ℓ.
Secondly, we prove the upper bound. By applying Gaussian elimination to any basis of C′, it follows that
there exist a basis u1, . . . , ud′ of C′ and distinct indices i1, . . . , id′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d} with the property that, for
each 1 ≤ j ≤ d′, the coefficient of a basis element vij of C in uj is 1 and the coefficient of vij in any other
uk (k 6= j) is 0. Now for an arbitrary element w =
∑d
i=1 civi ∈ C (ci ∈ F), the above property of u1, . . . , ud′
implies that the distance between w and w′ :=
∑d′
j=1 cijuj ∈ C
′ is at most d− d′, therefore d(w, C′) ≤ d− d′.
Hence we have r(C, C′) ≤ d− d′, concluding the proof of Proposition 4.
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The next result shows how the lower and upper bounds in Proposition 4 are close to each other:
Proposition 5. In the setting of Proposition 4, we have
ℓ ≤ codimC(C′) ≤ log|F|
(
cℓ(|F| − 1)
ℓdℓ/ℓ!
)
= ℓ(log|F|(|F| − 1) + log|F| d) + log|F| cℓ − log|F| ℓ! ,
(34)
where cℓ = ℓ+ 1 if F is the two-element field F2, and cℓ = (|F| − 1)/(|F| − 2) otherwise.
Proof. It suffices to prove the second inequality. As |F|codimC(C
′) ≤
∑ℓ
i=0
(
d
i
)
(|F| − 1)i by the definition of
ℓ, it suffices to show that
∑ℓ
i=0
(
d
i
)
(|F| − 1)i ≤ cℓ(|F| − 1)
ℓdℓ/ℓ!, or more generally,
∑m
i=0
(
N
i
)
(q − 1)i ≤
c′m(q − 1)
mNm/m! for all integers N ≥ m ≥ 0 and q ≥ 2, where we put c′m := (q − 1)/(q − 2) if q ≥ 3 and
c′m := m+ 1 if q = 2, and we set 00 = 1 (note that ℓ ≤ codimC(C′) ≤ d). We use induction on m. The case
m = 0 is trivial. For the case m ≥ 1, we have
m∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
(q − 1)i =
m−1∑
i=0
(
N
i
)
(q − 1)i +
(
N
m
)
(q − 1)m
≤
c′m−1(q − 1)
m−1Nm−1
(m− 1)!
+
(
N
m
)
(q − 1)m
≤
c′m−1(q − 1)
m−1Nm−1
(m− 1)!
+
(q − 1)mNm
m!
=
(q − 1)mNm
m!
(
c′m−1m
(q − 1)N
+ 1
)
.
(35)
By the relation m ≤ N and the definition of c′m, we have
c′m−1m
(q − 1)N
+ 1 ≤
c′m−1
q − 1
+ 1 = c′m , (36)
therefore the desired inequality holds for this m as well. Hence the claim of Proposition 5 holds.
5.2 Boolean functions of low degrees
As a first concrete example, here we deal with the set C of the functions X → Y with n-bit inputs and 1-bit
outputs, i.e., we set X := {0, 1}n and Y := {0, 1} (which is relevant to the situation of Section 4). First note
that, when we identify {0, 1} naturally with F2, each function f : X → Y can be expressed as an n-variable
square-free polynomial;
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
~a=(a1,...,an)∈{0,1}n
f(~a)χ~a(x1, . . . , xn) (37)
where we put
χ~a(x1, . . . , xn) :=
∏
i;ai=0
(1− xi)
∏
i;ai=1
xi for ~a = (a1, . . . , an) (38)
(note that χ~a(x1, . . . , xn) = 1 if xi = ai for every i and χ~a(x1, . . . , xn) = 0 otherwise, therefore χ~a is indeed
the characteristic function of ~a ∈ {0, 1}n). For example, when n = 2 we have
f(x1, x2) = f(0, 0)(1− x1)(1 − x2) + f(0, 1)(1− x1)x2
+ f(1, 0)x1(1 − x2) + f(1, 1)x1x2 .
(39)
Now for each 0 ≤ k ≤ n, we set C′ = C′k to be the subset of C consisting of functions that can be expressed
as a square-free polynomial of degree ≤ k. For example, C′0 is the set of constant functions, and C
′
1 is the
set of affine functions. The distance d(f, g) = dH(f, g) is defined as in (2). Note that changing the value of
f ∈ C at a point ~a ∈ {0, 1}n is equivalent to adding the function χ~a to the f . In this situation, we have the
following upper and lower bounds for the quantity r(C, C′k):
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Proposition 6. In the above setting, put un,k :=
∑n
i=k+1
(
n
i
)
, and let ℓn,k be the minimum integer ℓ
satisfying that 2un,k ≤
∑ℓ
i=0
(
2n
i
)
. Then we have
ℓn,k ≤ r(C, C
′
k) ≤ min{un,k, 2
n−1} . (40)
Proof. For the upper bound, note that r(C, C′k) ≤ 2
n−1, as any function f ∈ C can be converted into a
constant function by changing the value f(x) at every point x ∈ {0, 1}n with the property that f(x) is in
the minority among the 2n values of f (the number of such points is at most 2n−1). Then the upper bound
follows from Proposition 4, as C is an F2-vector space of dimension 2n and C′k is its subspace of codimension
un,k. The lower bound also follows from Proposition 4.
By Proposition 5, the quantities ℓn,k and un,k in Proposition 6 satisfy the relation ℓn,k ≤ un,k ≤ nℓn,k +
log2(ℓn,k + 1)− log2 ℓn,k!. Table 1 gives the precise values of ℓn,k for some smaller cases.
Table 1: The values of ℓn,k for some small parameters
n− k
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 1 2
3 1 2 4
4 1 2 4 8
n 5 1 2 5 10 16
6 1 2 5 13 22 32
7 1 2 6 16 31 49 64
8 1 2 6 19 43 75 105 128
Here we introduce a geometric point of view to the above problem. We introduce some notations. For a
subset I ⊂ [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}, put xI :=
∏
i∈I xi, and let aI be the element (a1, . . . , an) of {0, 1}
n determined
by ai = 1 when and only when i ∈ I. We write δI := χaI for simplicity. Let ∆
n−1
+ be the disjoint union
of an isolated point P and the standard (n − 1)-simplex ∆n−1 on the vertex set [n]; we regard P as “the
(−1)-dimensional face” of ∆n−1+ . For each ∅ 6= I ⊂ [n], let 〈I〉 denote the (|I| − 1)-dimensional sub-simplex
of ∆n−1 spanned by I, and let 〈I〉o be its relative interior (note that 〈{i}〉o = 〈{i}〉 = {i} for each i ∈ [n]).
On the other hand, we put 〈∅〉 = 〈∅〉o := P . Now for each function f(x) =
∑
I⊂[n] cIxI (cI ∈ F2), we define
its geometric realization Gf by
Gf :=
⋃
I;cI=1
〈Ic〉o (disjoint union), (41)
where Ic denotes the complement [n] \ I of I in [n]. For each I ⊂ [n], by the definition and the fact that
δI =
∑
J⊃I xJ (recall that now the values of functions are in F2), GδI is the (disjoint) union of P and 〈J〉
o
for all ∅ 6= J ⊂ Ic, therefore we have GδI = P ∪ 〈I
c〉. Moreover, for any 0 ≤ k ≤ n and I ⊂ [n], we have
|I| ≥ k+1 if and only if 〈Ic〉 is at most (n− k− 2)-dimensional. This implies that a function f ∈ C belongs
to C′k if and only if Gf does not intersect with the (n− k − 1)-dimensional skeleton ∆
n
n−k−1 of ∆
n−1
+ , which
consists of the faces of ∆n−1+ of dimension up to n− k − 1.
Based on the above observation, we consider the following puzzle. We imagine a situation that a lamp
is associated to each face of ∆n−1+ . A state of ∆
n−1
+ is a collection of light/dark properties of all the lamps.
Given a function f , the corresponding initial state If is defined in such a way that a lamp at a face is light
if and only if the relative interior of the face is contained in Gf . At any state, the player of the puzzle is
allowed to indicate a face F of ∆n−1+ (we call it “push the face F”), then the light/dark properties of lamps
at P and every sub-face of F are flipped; such a process is regarded as a move of the puzzle. An initial state
If is said to be solved when the lamps of all faces of ∆nn−k−1 are switched off by a sequence of moves started
from If . With this interpretation, the distance d(f, C′k) from f ∈ C to C
′
k is the minimum of the number of
moves to solve If , and the quantity r(C, C′k) is the minimal necessary number of moves to solve any initial
state.
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Moreover, we also introduce a simplified puzzle on ∆n−1 instead of ∆n−1+ by ignoring the isolated point
P in the above puzzle. Let r′n,k denote the minimal necessary number of moves to solve (for the simplified
puzzle) any initial state. Then we have r(C, C′k) = r
′
n,k + 1, as for an initial state I of the simplified puzzle
for which solving I requires precisely r′n,k moves, one of the two initial states of the original puzzle obtained
by adding a lamp at P which is light and dark, respectively, requires r′n,k + 1 moves. Hence it suffices to
consider the simplified puzzle on ∆n−1 for determining the quantity r(C, C′k).
Example 1. We set n = 4 and show that r(C, C′1) = 6, or equivalently r
′
4,1 = 5. Note that the general
bounds in Proposition 6 only guarantee that 4 ≤ r(C, C′1) ≤ 8 (note that u4,1 = 11 > 8 = 24−1). We identify
naturally each state in the puzzle on ∆n−1 = ∆3 with each family of non-empty subsets of [n] = [4], and we
write {i1, i2, . . . , iℓ} as i1i2 · · · iℓ for simplicity. Moreover, to express each state we omit the subsets of [4] of
size larger than 2, as the lamps at faces of dimension at least n − k − 1 = 2 are not relevant to determine
whether the puzzle has been solved or not. In other words, in the present situation, we can regard each state
as edge and vertex coloring of the complete graph K4.
First, we show that the initial state I = {13, 24} requires more than 4 moves to solve. Assume
contrary that I can be solved by at most 4 moves. If the player pushes the face 1234, then a state
{1, 2, 3, 4, 12, 23, 34, 41} is obtained. To solve the state by at most 3 remaining moves, the player has to
push at least one 2-dimensional face; we may assume by symmetry that the face is 123. Then the resulting
state is {4, 13, 34, 41}; however, a case-by-case analysis shows that to solve the state by at most 2 remaining
moves is impossible. Therefore the player does not push the face 1234. On the other hand, if the player
pushes a 2-dimensional face, then we may assume by symmetry that the face is 123, resulting in a state
{1, 2, 3, 12, 23, 24}. To solve the state by at most 3 remaining moves, the player has to push at least one
more 2-dimensional face. If it is 124, then we obtain a state {3, 4, 23, 41}, but a case-by-case analysis shows
that to solve the state by at most 2 remaining moves is impossible (the case of 234 is similar by symme-
try). If it is 134, then we obtain a state {2, 4, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24, 34}, but a case-by-case analysis shows that
to solve the state by at most 2 remaining moves is impossible as well. Therefore the player does not push
a 2-dimensional face. This implies that the player should push 13 and 24, resulting in a state {1, 2, 3, 4},
from which to solve the state by at most 2 remaining moves is impossible. Hence we have a contradiction,
therefore the initial state S = {13, 24} indeed requires more than 4 moves to solve.
Secondly, we show that any initial state I can be solved by at most 5 moves. The player can solve I by
at most 4 moves when no lamps in I at 1-dimensional faces are light, therefore I can be solved by at most 5
moves when at most 1 lamp in I at 1-dimensional face is light. When 2 lamps in I at 1-dimensional faces are
light, a case-by-case analysis shows that I can be solved by at most 4 moves unless I is of the form {i1i2, i3i4}
with {i1, i2} ∩ {i3, i4} = ∅, and for any I of the latter form, I can be solved by pushing the faces 1234,
i1i2i3, i1i2i4, i1, and i2. When 3 lamps in I at 1-dimensional faces are light, the problem can be reduced to
the case of 2 light lamps at 1-dimensional faces by pushing one of the 3 light lamps at 1-dimensional faces.
When 4 lamps in I at 1-dimensional faces are light, the problem can be reduced to the case of 2 light lamps
at 1-dimensional faces by pushing the face 1234 unless I is of the form {1, 2, 3, 4, i1i3, i1i4, i2i3, i2i4} with
{i1, i2} ∩ {i3, i4} = ∅, and for any I of the latter form, I can be solved by pushing the faces i1i2i3, i1i2i4,
i1, and i2. When 5 lamps in I at 1-dimensional faces are light, the problem can be reduced to the case of 2
light lamps at 1-dimensional faces by pushing an appropriate 2-dimensional face. Finally, when 6 lamps in I
at 1-dimensional faces are light, the problem can be reduced to the case of no light lamps at 1-dimensional
faces by pushing the face 1234. Hence any initial state I can be solved by at most 5 moves, therefore we
have r′4,1 = 5 as desired.
From now, we investigate FDPs in the above setting by using Gro¨bner bases. Recall that X = {0, 1}n.
Let R := K[zv | v ∈ X ] be a polynomial ring in 2n variables over a field K of characteristic 0. We define the
following ideal of R:
I0 := (zv
2 − 1 | v ∈ X) ⊂ R . (42)
For each f ∈ C, put
zf :=
∏
v∈X
zv
f(v) . (43)
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Then the set {zf | f ∈ C} of all square-free monomials in R forms a linear basis of the quotient ring
A0 := R/I0. Note that z
fzg = zf+g (mod I0) and the degree deg(z
f ) of zf in R is equal to d(f, 0) for any
f, g ∈ C, where 0 denotes the function in C taking constant value 0.
Let C′ be a subset of C, which need not be a linear subspace of C unless otherwise specified. We define
the following ideal of R:
IˇC′ := (zf − zg | f, g ∈ C′) ⊂ R , (44)
and consider the ideal IC′ := I0 + IˇC′ of R. We identify the quotient ring AC′ := R/IC′ with the quotient
ring of A0 by the image of IˇC′ . Now fix a graded monomial order, i.e., a monomial order ≺ satisfying that∏
v∈X zv
αv ≺
∏
v∈X zv
βv for any exponents (αv)v∈X and (βv)v∈X with
∑
v∈X αv <
∑
v∈X βv. Let G be a
Gro¨bner basis for the ideal IC′ , and consider the reduction process with respect to the Gro¨bner basis G. As
each generator of IC′ is of the form “(monic monomial)− (monic monomial)”, G can be chosen in such a way
that every element of G is of the same form, and the linear basis of A0 consisting of the square-free monic
monomials can be partitioned into equivalence classes when projected onto the quotient ring AC′ . This also
implies that the normal form nf(zf ) of each f ∈ C with respect to G is a square-free monic monomial, i.e.,
of the form zg with g ∈ C, and we have
deg(nf(zf )) = min{deg(zf
′
) | zf
′
= zf (mod IC′)}
= min{deg(zf
′
) | zf
′
− zf ∈ IC′} .
(45)
Now we consider the case that 0 ∈ C′. Note that zfzf = 1 = z0 (mod I0) for any f ∈ C. Now if
f, g ∈ C and zf = zg (mod IC′), then we have zf+g = zfzg = zfzf = z0 (mod IC′), therefore f + g ∈ C′.
Conversely, if f + g ∈ C′, then we have zfzg = zf+g = z0 = 1 (mod IC′), therefore zf = zfzgzg = zg
(mod IC′). Hence deg(nf(zf )) is equal to the minimal degree of zg with g ∈ C satisfying that f + g ∈ C′,
therefore d(f, C′) = deg(nf(zf )). This argument reduces the FDP in this setting to the problem of computing
(the degrees of) the normal forms of square-free monomials. More precisely, let hi denote the number of
monic monomials in AC′ whose normal forms have degree i, and put s := max{i | hi > 0}. (If the ideal is
homogeneous, then (hi)i is called the Hilbert function and it does not depend on the choice of a monomial
order.) Now the above argument implies that r(C, C′) = s. Moreover, if C′ is a linear subspace of C, then
we have hi · |C′| = |{f ∈ C | d(f, C′) = i}|, therefore the data (hi)i express the distributions of the distances
d(f, C′) over the functions f ∈ C.
Based on the above argument, Proposition 4 can be restated for the present case as follows:
Proposition 7. In the above setting, suppose that C′ is a linear subspace of C. Then we have
min{ℓ |
ℓ∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≥
2n
|C′|
} ≤ r(C, C′) ≤
2n
|C′|
. (46)
Proof. Note that the number of monic monomials in AC′ is 2n/|C′|. Then the lower bound follows from
the fact that the normal form of each monic monomial is also a monic monomial and that there exist
(
n
i
)
square-free monic monomials of degree i, hence hi ≤
(
n
i
)
. On the other hand, the upper bound is deduced
from the fact that each divisor of a monic monomial of normal form is also of normal form, hence hi = 0 if
hj = 0 and j < i. This concludes the proof.
For the case C′ = C′k as discussed above, Table 2 shows a calculation result of r(C, C
′
k) and (hi)i for small
parameters n and k, which is obtained by using computer algebra software Singular/Sage. By the table,
we have r(C, C′k) = 6 when (n, k) = (4, 1), as explained in Example 1. Note that the values of r(C, C
′
k) in
Table 2 are consistent with the lower bounds shown in Table 1.
5.3 Perfect codes and Reed–Solomon codes
In this subsection, we consider the case that C is an n-dimensional vector space over the q-element field
Fq, hence C is identified with Fqn, the distance d(·, ·) is defined to be the (generalized) Hamming distance
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Table 2: Computer calculation result for some small parameters
n k r(C, C′k) (hi)i≥0
2 1 1 (1, 1)
3 1 2 (1, 8, 7)
3 2 1 (1, 1)
4 1 6 (1, 16, 120, 560, 875, 448, 28)
4 2 2 (1, 16, 15)
4 3 1 (1, 1)
(with respect to the vector expressions of elements), and C′ is a linear subspace of C coming from the coding
theory. Let the subspace C′ be an (n,m, d)-code, i.e., dim(C′) = m and the minimum distance of C′ is d. By
the definition of minimum distance, we have the following well-known relation
qm
⌊d/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(q − 1)i ≤ qn . (47)
This and the argument in Proposition 4 implies that r(C, C′) ≥ ⌊d/2⌋.
We say that C′ is a perfect code, if the equality holds in (47). For a perfect code C′, the above argument
and Proposition 4 implies that r(C, C′) = ⌊d/2⌋. For example, if n = 2k − 1, q = 2 and C′ is the Hamming
code Hk which is a (2
k − 1, 2k − k − 1, 3)-code, then we have r(C, C′) = 1. On the other hand, if n = 23,
q = 2 and C′ is the binary Golay code G23 which is a perfect (23, 12, 7)-code, then we have r(C, C′) = 3. (In
the case of the extended Golay code C′ = G24 which is a nearly perfect (24, 12, 8)-code, where we set n = 24
and q = 2, we also have r(C, C′) = 4 in a similar manner.)
As another concrete class of C′ for which the quantity r(C, C′) can be explicitly determined, from now
we study the case of Reed–Solomon codes, which is also an important class of linear codes. We write q = pe
with a prime number p and an integer e ≥ 1, and choose an integer k with 1 ≤ k < n. Take a primitive
element α of Fq, i.e., Fq
× = 〈α〉. Define a polynomial G(x) ∈ Fq[x] of degree n− k by
G(x) := (x− 1)(x− α)(x − α2) · · · (x− αn−k−1) . (48)
For any integer j ≥ 0, let Pj denote the set of polynomials in Fq[x] of degrees up to j, which is a (j + 1)-
dimensional Fq-linear subspace of Fq[x]. We identify Pn−1 with C via the correspondence
∑n−1
i=0 aix
i 7→∑n−1
i=0 aivi, where (v0, . . . , vn−1) is a distinguished linear basis of C. Now we introduce the following two
linear maps:
ϕn,k : Pk−1 → Pn−1 , f(x) 7→ G(x)f(x) , (49)
ψn,k : Pn−1 → Fqn−k , f(x) 7→ (f(1), f(α), f(α2), . . . , f(αn−k−1)) . (50)
Let C′ be the image of ϕn,k, which is a subspace of C (via the above identification C ≃ Pn−1). This C′ is a
Reed–Solomon code. Note that C′ coincides with the kernel of ψn,k. Now we have the following result:
Proposition 8. In the above setting of Reed–Solomon code, we have r(C, C′) = n− k.
Proof. As dim(C′) = k, the inequality r(C, C′) ≤ n− k follows from Proposition 4. From now, we show that
r(C, C′) ≥ n− k, or equivalently, there exists an element u ∈ C satisfying that d(u, C′) ≥ n− k.
For each polynomial f(x) ∈ Pn−1, the condition d(f(x), C′) ≤ n − k − 1 is equivalent to the following:
There exist indices 0 ≤ ν1 < ν2 < · · · < νn−k−1 ≤ n − 1 and coefficients cj ∈ Fq (1 ≤ j ≤ n − k − 1) for
which we have f(x)−
∑n−k−1
j=1 cjx
νj ∈ C′ = kerψn,k, or equivalently,
f(αi) =
n−k−1∑
j=1
cjβνj
i for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n− k − 1 , (51)
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where we put βνj := α
νj . The condition (51) can be expressed as


f(α0)
f(α1)
...
f(αn−k−1)

 =


βν1
0 βν2
0 · · · βνN−K−1
0
βν1
1 βν2
1 · · · βνN−K−1
1
...
...
...
...
βν1
n−k−1 βν2n−k−1 · · · βνn−k−1
n−k−1

~c , (52)
where ~c denotes the column vector t(c1, c2, . . . , cn−k−1). For simplicity, let B and ~b denote, respectively, the
first n− k − 1 rows and the last row of the above matrix; i.e., the above condition is written as
t(f(α0), f(α1), . . . , f(αn−k−1)) =
(
B
~b
)
~c . (53)
Now, as α is a primitive element of Fq, all βνj are distinct with each other and hence B is a Vandermonde
matrix which is invertible. Therefore, the condition (51) implies that ~c = B−1·t(f(α0), f(α1), . . . , f(αn−k−2))
and f(αn−k−1) = ~b~c. On the other hand, the latter condition is not satisfied when f(αi) = 0 for every
0 ≤ i ≤ n− k − 2 and f(αn−k−1) 6= 0, e.g., f(x) =
∏n−k−2
i=0 (x − α
i). Hence this element f(x) ∈ C satisfies
that d(f(x), C′) ≥ n− k, as desired. This concludes the proof of Proposition 8.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we first specified a class of mathematical problems, which we call Function Density Problems.
Then we pointed out novel connections of Function Density Problems to theoretical security evaluations of
keyless hash functions and to constructions of provably secure pseudorandom generators with some enhanced
security property. Our argument aimed at proposing new theoretical frameworks for these topics (especially
for the former) based on Function Density Problems, rather than providing some concrete and practical
results on the topics. We also gave some examples of mathematical discussions on the problems, which
would be of independent interest from mathematical viewpoints.
To conclude this paper, we discuss some possible directions of future works. First, there exist some
cryptographic protocols for which the constructions are motivated by some NP-complete/NP-hard problems,
but actually the distributions of the problem instances in the protocols are somewhat biased, therefore it has
not succeeded to prove the security of the protocols directly from the hardness of the underlying problems
(e.g., McEliece cryptosystem and other code-based protocols relevant to decoding problem for random linear
codes; knapsack cryptosystem relevant to Subset Sum Problem; etc.). We hope that the idea of Function
Density Problems can be applied to measure the closeness of the approximations of the underlying hard
problems in those protocols. Secondly, for the mathematical characteristics of Function Density Problems,
it would be interesting to evaluate the computational difficulty of Function Density Problems (e.g., to prove,
if possible, that Function Density Problems are NP-hard). Moreover, as the examples of Function Density
Problems in this paper are for the case that the subset C′ of C forms a linear subspace, it would be also
significant to study the other cases that C′ is not a linear subspace of C.
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